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In Vieth et al. (2014a), we conducted three experiments to examine semantic relatedness effects in
the picture-word interference (PWI) paradigm. According to the lexical selection by competition
account of spoken word production, feature overlap between the target picture and related
distractor word induces semantic interference. However, this account has been challenged by
studies demonstrating semantic facilitation in the PWI paradigm (e.g., Costa et al., 2005; Mahon
et al., 2007; but see Hutson and Damian, 2014; Sailor and Brooks, 2014; Vieth et al., 2014b). In Vieth
et al. (2014a), we investigated whether some reports of semantic facilitation in PWI might be due
to the influence of distinctive features, i.e., features that quickly distinguish a concept from other
similar concepts, as previous studies had not controlled for this variable (e.g., Costa et al., 2005;
Mahon et al., 2007; Sailor and Brooks, 2014). In Experiment 3, we observed semantic interference
for distractor words denoting a non-distinctive feature (e.g., knee) visible in the target picture
(e.g., CAMEL), but no interference for distractor words denoting a distinctive feature (e.g., hump)
compared to matched sets of distractors denoting unrelated features. We argued this finding is
consistent with lexical selection by competition accounts, and might entail additional spread of
activation to related concepts that share the non-distinctive feature via the appropriate category
node (e.g., Animals). In their commentary, Montefinese and Vinson (2015) arrive at the opposite
conclusion, arguing that feature distinctiveness does not affect the degree of interference in PWI.
Here, we respond to each of their objections.
Montefinese and Vinson’s (2015) principal objection concerned the statistical significance tests
of the higher order interaction between distractor relatedness, distinctiveness and stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA), and partial interaction of relatedness and distinctiveness at the −150ms SOA.
Our response to this objection revisits longstanding debates in experimental psychology about
the use of arbitrary alpha levels to justify dichotomous decisions and failure to consider the
size of effects (e.g., Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1989; Kirk, 2003; Cumming, 2014). In Vieth et al.
(2014a), the p-values for the higher-order interaction by participants and by items were 0.06 and
0.078, respectively, and the interaction was a medium sized effect (partial η2 = 0.10 and 0.11,
respectively; e.g., Vacha-Haase and Thompson, 2004). Montefinese and Vinson misrepresent the
two-way interaction as being “far from significant.” In fact, this partial interaction was statistically
significant in the items analysis and a larger effect (p = 0.023; partial η2 = 0.21). Surprisingly,
Montefinese and Vinson chose to cite Nieuwenhuis et al. (2011) to support their criticism of
the statistical significance tests of the interactions, yet those authors wrote: “as famously noted
by Rosnow and Rosenthal, ‘surely, God loves the 0.06 nearly as much as the 0.05.’ Thus, when
making a comparison between two effects, researchers should report the statistical significance
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of their difference rather than the difference between their
significance levels.” (p. 1105). This is precisely the approach taken
in Vieth et al. (2014a): interactions were reported and an arbitrary
0.05 level was not used to justify a dichotomous decision (cf.
Montefinese and Vinson, 2015).
Of note, other researchers have followedmarginally significant
interactions with planned comparisons in PWI studies and
offered discussions about why higher order interactions are
particularly difficult to detect (e.g., Starreveld and La Heij,
1995; Damian and Martin, 1999). This two-pronged approach is
preferred because semantic relatedness effects (i.e., interference
and facilitation) in PWI are defined and demonstrated by
planned comparisons of related vs. unrelated distractors. Costa
et al. (2005) reported facilitation with related feature distractors
using this approach. In Vieth et al. (2014b) we likewise contrasted
distinctive and non-distinctive feature distractors with their
respective matched unrelated distractor sets, as these were the
chief comparisons we were interested in examining prior to
commencing data collection. We were unable to create perfectly
matched sets of distinctive and non-distinctive distractors, as
we noted. Hence, our hypotheses applied to only a subset of
the data contributing to the interaction term, as there was no
a priori reason for contrasting the two unrelated distractor sets.
Only non-distinctive feature distractors showed a significant
interference effect both by participants (p = 0.011) and by
items (p = 0.003), of moderate to large effect size (d =
0.52 and 0.69, respectively). It is worth emphasizing planned
contrasts are typically conducted whether or not the overall F-
test is significant; at least this is the convention according to
introductory experimental design and statistics textbooks (e.g.,
Kirk, 1982; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1985; Keppel, 1991; Lomax
and Hahs-Vaughn, 2012).
Montefinese and Vinson (2015) next expressed concern about
Vieth et al.’s failure to match distinctive and non-distinctive
features across distractor sets in terms of a “crucial semantic
variable” called dominance—or production frequency, noting
that many of the non-distinctive distractors (e.g., bone, skin) were
not listed in the McRae et al.’s (2005) feature production norms.
Production frequency refers to the number of participants that
list a particular feature for a given concept in feature norming
tasks, and has been interpreted as a measure of semantic saliency
(e.g., Cree et al., 2006). Montefinese and Vinson argued that
as many of the non-distinctive distractors were not listed in
the McRae et al. norms, they were not salient for their related
target concepts, and therefore were not sufficiently strong lexical
competitors to induce the significant interference effect that we
observed. As this argument relies on the novel assumption that
dominance is a crucial measure of the strength of conceptual
feature activation in PWI, it is worth examining in more detail.
For pragmatic purposes, researchers impose limits on both
the time allowed and on the number of features to be produced
for a given concept in feature norming studies, and then only
include features in the resulting norms if a minimum number
of participants listed them (e.g., 5/30 in McRae et al.’s, 2005).
It is not surprising then, that feature norms do not represent
exhaustive listings for each concept. Indeed as Montefinese et al.
(2014) put it: “in a (theoretically) ideal experiment, if we asked
a group of participants to list all of the possible features of
a given concept, without posing any temporal or quantitative
limits, we would end having a very large number of features
with a dominance value close or equal to 1. In fact, even the less
important feature for that concept would eventually be listed, by
most of the participants, making dominance a poor measure of a
feature’s importance/salience for a concept representation.” (italics
added; p. 356–357). We concur with Montefinese et al. (2014)
view.
As Montefinese and Vinson (2015) noted, we were careful to
match our PWI stimuli on a range of variables. In particular,
we ensured associative relations between distractors and targets
were minimal (Nelson et al., 2004). In free-association tasks,
participants are given a cue word and required to list words
that come to mind, a substantial proportion of which are
features (De Deyne and Storms, 2008). Thus, “free association
probabilities index the relative accessibility of related words in
memory” (Nelson et al., 2004, p. 402). It should be apparent that
dominance and free association probability are both measures
of the relative availability of lexical knowledge. The potential
collinearity between the two measures was acknowledged by
Montefinese et al. (2014): “Consequently, if we consider the
feature listing as a type of controlled word association task
wherein the words are restricted to the features (Cree et al.,
2006), we could presume that the order of production would
also capture the lexical association link between concept and
feature.” (pp. 366–367). It therefore should not come as a
surprise that the majority of our distractor stimuli in Vieth
et al. (2014a) had low dominance, because features with high
free association probabilities/high production frequencies had
been mostly eliminated during their construction. However, the
correlation is not perfect. When presented with the cue CAMEL,
only a small proportion (22/148 or 15%) of the participants in
the Nelson et al. (2004) normative study freely associated the
concept with the feature hump, indicating it was not particularly
accessible or salient to them. As Montefinese and Vinson point
out, a higher proportion listed hump in McRae et al. (2005)
normative study due to the use of an explicit instruction to list
only the features of a CAMEL. Of the two measures, our view is
that lexical association is the more important variable to control,
as it has already been shown to influence naming latencies in PWI
experiments.
Further, there is no evidence to support Montefinese and
Vinson’s claim of “substantial differences” in dominance of
the distinctive and non-distinctive features in Vieth et al. The
median production frequency for our distinctive distractors was
low, only 8/30 (or 27%) according to McRae et al.’s (2005)
norms. While dominance has been shown to influence decision
latencies on feature verification tasks, the classic studies showing
these effects contrasted high (i.e., greater than 50%) vs. low
production frequencies (e.g., Conrad, 1972; Ashcraft, 1978).
Feature verification, in which participants are asked to indicate
whether given features are true of target concepts (e.g., by reading
property statements), also differs considerably from instructing
participants to name a target picture while ignoring a distractor
word. This difference in procedures is important to emphasize,
as it is well-established that semantic relatedness effects depend
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1984
Vieth et al. Reply to Montefinese and Vinson
critically on the nature of the experimental task. Given all of
the above, we find little reason to entertain Montefinese and
Vinson’s conjecture about dominance significantly influencing
our findings.
Aside from dominance, another theoretical issue introduced
by Montefinese and Vinson (2015) in their commentary
is the level-of-specificity between distractor and target in
PWI. For example, (Hantsch et al., 2005; also Hantsch and
Mädebach, 2013) reported that subordinate level distractors
(e.g., Mini) produced interference when related objects were
named at the basic level (e.g., CAR). Montefinese and Vinson
(2015) speculate our findings might be akin to a level-of-
specificity effect and propose that the presence of the feature
denoted by the distractor in the target picture (e.g., knee)
might “permit further activation of its name as a potentially
plausible alternative to the basic-level target name” (e.g.,
CAMEL).
Montefinese and Vinson do not provide an adequate
explanation of the mechanism by which merely raising the lexical
activation level of a feature-level distractor representation would
make it a plausible response when the instruction is to name the
entire target object (e.g., in Hantsch et al.’s level-of-specificity
manipulation above, Mini and CAR are appropriate names for
a picture of a Mini as they both denote the entire object, unlike
wheel). We note the similarity of this proposal with Mahon
et al.’s (2007) response exclusion account that attributes semantic
interference to a post-lexical decision mechanism operating
according to response-relevant criteria. As we acknowledged
in Vieth et al. (2014b), the response exclusion account could
possibly be modified to explain our finding by assuming visible
features of target pictures constitute response relevant criteria,
despite the instruction to name the whole object. However, this
would involve abandoning Mahon et al.’s (2007) assumption
that conceptual feature overlap does not constitute a response-
relevant criterion.
Montefinese and Vinson’s (2015) more empirical objection
to our finding of semantic interference concerned the −150ms
SOA at which the significant effect was observed in Experiment
3. Specifically, they characterized the result as “temporally-
selective,” implying the effect should have been observed at both
0 and −150ms SOAs in the one experiment. In PWI timecourse
studies, the semantic interference effect for category coordinates
is typically found at either −150 or 0ms SOAs, yet the literature
shows the effect is often not significant at both of these SOAs
within the same experiment (e.g., La Heij et al., 1990; Schriefers
et al., 1990; Starreveld and La Heij, 1996; Damian and Martin,
1999; Damian and Bowers, 2003). In Sailor and Brooks’ (2014)
PWI study, significant interference from feature distractors was
observed at the 0ms SOA but not at −150ms. This variability
in the reported results for early and 0ms SOAs likely reflects
procedural differences across PWI studies, such as the use of
written vs. auditory distractors, or central vs. random positioning
of written distractors. In the PWI procedure, auditory distractors
take longer to process than written ones, so an interference effect
is more likely to be obtained at earlier SOAs (see Damian and
Martin, 1999). Less-predictable placement of distractor words
will likewise affect processing time. Consequently, there is no
empirical reason to accept Montefinese and Vinson’s stipulation
that significant interference for related feature distractors should
occur at both SOAs in the one PWI experiment.
According to the lexical selection by competition account,
semantic interference is the result of a tradeoff between
the priming of the target representation by the distractor
and the priming of the distractor’s lexical representation
by the target (e.g., Roelofs, 1992). Montefinese and Vinson
(2015) objected to our adopting this interpretation for the
significant interference effect at −150ms (e.g., Roelofs, 1992;
Starreveld and La Heij, 1996). Their premise is that activation
cannot spread from target to distractor at the −150ms
SOA as the target picture is yet to be presented. Logically,
this criticism would also apply to the reported findings of
semantic interference for category-coordinates at −150ms and
earlier SOAs, and so challenge lexical-selection-by competition
accounts, if the premise were accurate (e.g., La Heij et al.,
1990; Schriefers et al., 1990; Starreveld and La Heij, 1995,
1996; Damian and Martin, 1999). However, Montefinese and
Vinson’s (2015) premise reflects a misunderstanding of the
typical PWI procedure that involves written distractor words
remaining on screen while the target picture is presented
and until the participant responds (e.g., Vieth et al., 2014a).
As naming latencies in PWI are usually between 600 to
800ms, this provides ample time for target-to-distractor
priming.
In conclusion, we find none of the theoretical, empirical, or
statistical objections raised by Montefinese and Vinson (2015)
to be particularly compelling, as they reflect a combination
of conjecture, misunderstanding and misrepresentation.
However, we concur with them that the details of conceptual
representations remain underspecified in production models.
To this end, further empirical work is needed, rather than
commentary.
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